Of 13 militants killed in a counter-terrorism operation in Kashmir on 1 April, 11 were local Kashmiris from Shopian district.

• On 11 April, Indian security forces conducted a counter-terrorism operation in Kashmir's Kulgam district. The government forces reported encountering unexpectedly strong civilian support for the militants during the operation.
• Since the killing of local militant Burhan Wani in July 2016 the number of local Kashmiri men joining militant groups in Kashmir has increased, particularly from Shopian district.
• Increasing indigenization is likely to trigger an escalation in militant attacks, primarily due to reported support for local militants among sections of the civilian population.
• Despite increasing militancy, this issue is highly likely to remain concentrated within the state of Kashmir and is not expected to spread to other cities and/or states in India.

On 11 April, Indian security forces reportedly fired explosives at a house in Khudwani in south Kashmir's Kulgam district in an attempt to draw out suspected Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militants. LeT is one of three major militant groups operating in Kashmir together with Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM).

Although security forces have not disclosed the number of militants killed in the attack, hundreds of civilians protested the assault, leading to the deaths of approximately four protesters. Although support for such militants is well recorded in Kashmir, the level of reaction, with protesters engaging in stone-throwing, was reportedly unexpected and expedited the escape of several suspects.

This follows an increase in militancy in Kashmir since 2017: according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, about 20 militants had been killed across Kashmir by April in 2017, but this number sharply increased to approximately 45 militants killed within the equivalent period of 2018. On 1 April, 13 militants were killed across Anantnag and Shopian districts in south Kashmir in one of the largest counter-terrorism operations conducted by security forces to date in 2018.

Burhan Wani's death triggered indigenization of militancy, particularly from Shopian district

The indigenization of Kashmir-based militants has markedly increased. Since the killing of Burhan Wani - a local HM militant from Pulwama district - in July 2016, it is highly likely that anti-Indian sentiment has intensified, thus influencing more local Kashmiri men to join militant groups. Wani was the first militant to promote militancy among local Kashmiri youths through social media, increasing his appeal across the state.

South Kashmir's Shopian district, previously regarded as peaceful, has also witnessed a notable uptick in militancy. Prior to Wani's killing in 2016, security forces focused mainly on districts traditionally known to harbor militancy, including Sopore, Anantnag, and Pulwama. A widely circulated photo of HM militants posing with guns posted by Wani on social media in 2016 - which was taken in Turkwangam village in Shopian - is known to have encouraged militancy in the district, where the security presence was already low, following Wani's death. According to local police records, since 2016 there has been a four-fold increase in the number of militants originating from Shopian. Of the 13 militants killed on 1 April, 11 were reportedly from the district.

Threat from the Islamic State in Kashmir remains low

Following the killing of a local police officer in November 2017 - allegedly by an Islamic State supporter - the Ministry of Home Affairs stated that the incident was probably falsely attributed to the Islamic State and that the group had no presence in Kashmir. Despite the government's official stance, it is likely that alleged Islamic State sympathizers will carry out isolated attacks targeting police forces in the one-year outlook. However, the group is unlikely to garner large-scale support, primarily because of differences in objectives. The three major militant groups operating in Kashmir - LeT, JeM, and HM - are regarded as anti-India and pro-Pakistan. Conversely, Islamic State propaganda targeting Kashmir encourages action against both India and Pakistan in order to promote Islamic practices, a position that is unlikely to find mass support in Kashmir for the foreseeable future.

Outlook and implications

Although it is unlikely that militancy in Kashmir will return to the levels seen in the 1990s - when about 4,000 attacks were reported in a single year compared with approximately 320 in 2016 (which is regarded as a violent year by recent standards) - in the one-year outlook, attacks by militants are likely to increase further, particularly ahead of general and state elections that are due by 2019 (and potentially earlier in November-December 2018). Besides attacks against security forces, an increase in attacks against political representatives is likely; militant groups oppose elections in Kashmir as these are regarded as symbols of the Indian state. Although local populations are not directly targeted in attacks, they are likely to be caught in cross-fires between security forces and militants.

Increasing indigenization, particularly in Shopian, is likely to increase the sustainability of Kashmiri militancy. Indigenous militants are likely to receive greater support from the civilian population, thus weakening police informant networks. Furthermore, Shopian, Anantnag, Pulwama, and Kulgam are neighboring districts, which is likely to facilitate escape for militants across bases, particularly when a counter-terrorism operation is expected. Militancy is highly likely to remain focused within Kashmir - and is accordingly unlikely to spread to other cities or states in India - because its objective is a local issue, and indigenous militants will mostly seek to consolidate the anti-India movement within a state where they are able to secure civilian support.

Indian security forces are reported to have largely controlled militancy in the 1990s by resorting to covert operations as opposed to open encounters. A return to more covert operations, which reduces the likelihood of mass protests, is likely to deter further indigenous radicalization. Furthermore, as a political measure to counter militancy, the state government of Jammu and Kashmir is expected to introduce a rehabilitation program, including skills-training for local Kashmiris that renounce militancy. This measure is likely to reduce the number of active militants in the state.