On 2 May, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the double suicide attack that targeted the High National Election Commission (HNEC) office based in the Libyan capital Tripoli, killing 16 people.

• The attack in Tripoli was the latest of a series of attacks mounted by Islamic State militants targeting election-related sites and individuals in a number of countries where the group has a presence, notably Iraq and Afghanistan.
• Those attacks followed a 22 April audio message issued by the Islamic State's spokesperson Abu al-Hasan al-Muhajir and an increase in propaganda material focused on elections and democratic processes in Muslim-majority countries, which indicate a coherent strategy to reinvigorate the group's support base and relevance in mainstream Islamic communities following the de-facto collapse of its Caliphate in Syria and Iraq.
• The Islamic State's ability to follow through with its threats will be a key indicator to assess the group's current capabilities across the region and its ability to project guidance and provide support to multiple local affiliates.

According to Libyan media, the attack on the HNEC was carried out by two individuals who forced their way into the building and opened fire, before detonating suicide improvised explosive devices (IEDs). At least 16 people were killed and 11 injured, including thee security guards, in the attack. In a statement released by the Islamic State official Amaq News Agency a few hours later, the group stated that the operation was in response to the call by the group's spokesperson, Sheikh Abu al-Hasan al-Muhajir, to "target centers of polytheist elections and those who support them" on 22 April. The last Islamic State-claimed attack in Tripoli was carried out in 2015, although the group remains highly active in central and southern areas of Libya. On 3 May, local media citing Libyan intelligence sources reported that around 300 Islamic State fighters have returned to Libya from Syria and Iraq during the past two months.

Libya aims to hold presidential and parliamentary elections before the end of 2018, as stipulated by the July 2017 Paris agreement between Fayez Serraj, prime minister of the western UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), and Khalifa Haftar, commander of the eastern Libyan National Army (LNA) militia coalition. The HNEC is tasked with producing the supporting regulations needed to hold the elections, including the registration of voters.

Islamic State propaganda: focus on democracy and elections

Like any other jihadist group, the Islamic State considers democracy and elections as antithetical to Islam and the rule of Allah on earth, arguing as is common in transnational jihadist discourse, that democracy encroaches on divine sovereignty, as humans would be likening themselves to the Creator by presuming to create their own laws, thereby violating the fundamental monotheistic principle of Tawhid. Jihadists consider this to be the equivalent of polytheism, and use this as a prominent argument to justify their designation of individuals, governments, and organizations supporting democratic or any other form of governance, which falls outside a very narrow interpretation of sharia (Islamic law), as apostates. Jihadists have often found this argument to be most effective in mainstream conservative Islamic communities who are increasingly frustrated with their governments and have no realistic prospect of achieving political or economic change.

This reasoning has likely shaped the Islamic State's current anti-election propaganda campaign, which started in mid-February during the lead-up to Egypt's March 2018 presidential election. The Islamic State's Wilayat Sinai released a video condemning the vote and calling on "true" Muslims to avoid large gatherings on election day, hinting at potential attacks targeting polling stations. In March, the group's weekly publication, al-Naba, featured an article condemning the Tunisian president's proposal to grant women equal inheritance rights to men, stating that democracy was "a greater evil than tyrannical rule". More recently, the group's supporters on Telegram social media channels have issued death threats against a candidate in the upcoming 12 May local elections. Similarly, the 20 April edition of al-Naba included an infographic demonizing elections held in Muslim countries. The article also featured a fatwa (religious ruling) which excommunicated anyone who took part in the process: candidates, voters, and administrative workers. The concept was reiterated again on 22 April by the Islamic State's spokesperson in an audio message that specifically threatened the Shia-dominated Iraqi government, and declared that the group would attack polling stations in Iraq during the May parliamentary election and against anyone who took part in the vote "in any capacity". On 4 May, an article featured in the latest edition of al-Naba, entitled "The Islamic State and the religion of democracy", which stated that in the past the group refrained from targeting voters because "Muslims were not well informed about the evils of democracy". The article added that "today after years of Islamic State preaching on the subject, Muslims had no excuse to being ignorant", hence are legitimate targets if they participate in the process.

Islamic State attacks on election-related targets

The Islamic State's threats to disrupt electoral processes have already started to materialize this year. In Iraq, the group has already claimed 11 elections-related attacks, most recently on 2 May, when Islamic State militants placed an IED outside the house of a female candidate in the Turkmen-dominated district of Tuz Khurmatu in northern Iraq. The highest-profile attack occurred on 8 April, when the group claimed an assault against the headquarters of the Sunni al-Hal (Solution) party in Hut city in the western province of Anbar, killing seven people and injuring 13 others. In Tunisia, the Islamic State has failed to follow through its threats to date. We note that the high-profile pro-Islamic State channels on Telegram nevertheless shared photographs on 2 May of a house that it claimed belonged to a "participant in the polytheist municipal elections in Tunisia" in the northern town of Menzel Bourguiba, indicating a continuing intent. The images featured graffiti on the house threatening murder. In Afghanistan, the Islamic State published an infographic on 5 April claiming the killing of 110 political party members in Kabul over six months. In the deadliest attack of this series, the Islamic State carried out a suicide attack at a voter registration center in Kabul on 22 April, killing 40 people and injuring 60.

Outlook and implications

The Islamic State's intensified emphasis in its propaganda and actions on targeting democratic governance reflects a coherent strategy intended to revive the group and demonstrate its continued relevance to the public across the MENA region and beyond, following the collapse of its caliphal state in Iraq and Syria. The elections in Iraq and Libya hold particular significance for the Islamic State since they would be the first following their governments' declaration of victory over the group; a theme that is widely resonating in the cross-party political slogans in Iraq and Libya. The Islamic State has a direct stake in disrupting these upcoming elections in particular, and reducing public confidence in the electoral process, in order to maintain the option of reviving its governance project in Iraq, Libya, and Syria in the future. Spreading fear around participation in the election, combined with an observed spike in low-level tribal conflict in southern Iraq, indicate that the overall level of violence across the country is likely to intensify over the coming month. There are also likely to be delays in the announcements of the results, as was the case in last election in 2014.

In the days immediately preceding the vote and in the period of vote counting afterward, Islamic State attacks targeting electoral candidates, party offices, and polling stations are most likely to be in the three provinces with a strong Islamic State presence, Anbar, Diyalah, and Ninawa, as well as in the capital Baghdad, and to a lesser extent in Babil and Wasit provinces surrounding Baghdad.

In Libya, we assess that persisting fractures in governance between the East and the West, combined with the likely progressive incorporation of militants returning from Iraq and Syria, means that the Islamic State will continue to have the necessary space to reorganize its ranks and expand its operations in eastern Libya, which is controlled by the LNA.

Further attacks on electoral and party offices in cities such as Ajdabiya, Benghazi, Bin Jawad, Misratah, Tobruq, and Tripoli are likely in the six-month outlook. Ultimately, the Islamic State's ability to follow through its declared intent in coming months will be a key indicator of the group's capability to penetrate new territory, expand its presence and level of activity across the region, and its capacity to direct and support multiple local affiliates, sympathizers, and returnees.

Success in Tunisia in particular, where the group's capabilities have been degraded, but not completely eroded, over the past two years, would further indicate an improved prospect of a broader Islamic State resurgence in North Africa and the Sahel.